Showing posts with label copenhagen. Show all posts
Showing posts with label copenhagen. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 4, 2011

Cancun Climate Negotiation | Center for Strategic and International Studies

Cancun Climate Negotiation | Center for Strategic and International Studies

By Sarah O. Ladislaw Dec 15, 2010

(I have enjoyed many of CSIS's talks on the China-in-Africa discussions from last year. This one seems to be fairly comprehensive. But for better understanding I would suggest you skip through the Copenhagen assessment as well. It's really interesting to note the changes, development and "progresses" taking shape between these big meetings. Again the whole climate change politics and policy extravaganza is a constantly and intriguingly evolving discourse as our understanding of the complexity and interconnectedness of our climate and many aspects of our human civilizations)

For the last two weeks international climate negotiators met in Cancun, Mexico for the 16th Conference of Parties (COP) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). After last year’s near-catastrophe in Copenhagen (see our assessment of the Copenhagen talks), countries spent the better part of the past year tamping down expectations for this year’s round of negotiations. Instead of shooting for the completion of a legally binding agreement, the negotiators focused on making incremental progress on some of the foundational elements of a new regime while sidestepping the issue of whether to extend the Kyoto Protocol and avoiding a more serious discussion about the diminishing likelihood that the international community will be able to reach its collective climate goals.

What agreements were reached in Cancun?

The climate talks in Cancun successfully “anchored” agreements reached last year in the formal negotiating progress and filled out some of the details in each major area. Last year, the negotiators reached an eleventh-hour political agreement referred to as the Copenhagen Accord. For many developed economies, chief among them the United States, this agreement is meant to serve as the foundation for a new global agreement because it solves some of the deficiencies of the Kyoto Protocol (namely, it includes emissions reduction pledges and transparency provisions for all major economies, not just the traditional developed countries). The agreement is broadly supported among the parties but was never formally adopted by the entire group. Todd Stern, the U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, described the outcome of the Cancun negotiations as “approving and elaborating” on the Copenhagen Accord. This characterization can be derived from the fact that all the key elements of the Copenhagen Accord (i.e., emissions reductions, transparency, financing, technology sharing, forestry and land use, and adaptation) were included in the Cancun agreement. Moreover, while the Copenhagen Accord focused on high-level principles and agreements on each of those issues, the agreement in Cancun begins to set down some substantive detail about how each will be carried out (see the chart below for a partial summary of how the Cancun agreement built upon the major pillars of the Copenhagen Accord).

Does this agreement signify progress or more of the same?

For those paying close attention to the climate negotiation process, the progress made in Cancun is tangible and significant. It solidifies the core achievement from the Copenhagen Accord: all major developed and developing economies are willing to take action and be held to some level of accountability for emissions reductions. This is a significant departure from the world of the Kyoto Protocol and engenders some level of momentum for near-term action on emissions reduction activity.

In other ways, the outcome revealed that the negotiations have become a process that is waiting for the stars to realign before attempting to make any big breakthroughs or address some of the core underlying problems. The decision not to take on major issues seems to be strategic and pragmatic. The negotiators purposely did not take on thorny issues about increasing emissions reduction pledges (which are widely viewed as inadequate for reaching the agreed-upon target of limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius) or ensuring greater levels of financing for developing country mitigation and adaptation efforts. From a practical standpoint, negotiators recognized that none of the parties were in a position to strengthen emissions or financial pledges due to domestic political and financial constraints, so instead, negotiators focused on things they could accomplish in order to facilitate as much real action on the suite of measures as possible.

Where do the negotiations go from here?

The next round of formal negotiations (there will be preparatory negotiations throughout the course of 2011) will take place in Durban, South Africa, at the end of next year. Many analysts have rightly noted that it be will difficult for the negotiators to make the same type of “incremental progress” next year and avoid some of the underlying disagreements and core weaknesses of the current regime. One example of this is the question of whether to extend the Kyoto Protocol for another commitment period. During the negotiations in Cancun, Japan and several other countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol stated that they would not sign on to a second commitment period. All of this is, in some way, political theater. The idea that major developed economies would continue to be part of a legally binding agreement that does not somehow bring in the other major emitters has been a nonstarter for developed country signatories of the Kyoto Protocol for quite some time. However, the Kyoto Protocol is a critically important document for developing countries as it enshrines many of the core principles and structures that they view as the necessary foundation for any and all future action. The agreement reached in Cancun simply puts off a decision about whether to extend the Kyoto Protocol until next year (though it is hard to see how parties will be any closer to an agreement 12 months hence). The underlying strategy here is to build up a “replacement” for the Kyoto Protocol—an agreement that includes all the core principles that the developing world wants to see (e.g., common but differentiated standards, financing for mitigation and adaptation measures, etc.) but breaks down some of the barriers between developed and developing country action that the developed world simply cannot accept. Over time, if parties became more confident in a new agreement, the Kyoto Protocol will seem less important and hopefully fade away (because nobody ever kills these types of agreements). It is doubtful, however, that this type of confidence will be achieved before the deadline for extension comes up.

Perhaps more importantly, the international community seemed reluctant to accept that given current trajectories, the prospect of reaching their stated emissions reduction goals is increasingly unlikely. Most negotiators openly recognize that the world is not on course to effectively limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius. This will become increasingly evident as more time passes, especially if major emitters like the United States are not able to make tangible and meaningful progress on emissions reductions. At some point individual countries as well as the global community will have to accept this new reality and come to grips with what it means for our collective action approach.

Progression from Copenhagen Accord to Cancun Outcome

(not intended to be comprehensive)

Pillars of a “Balanced Package”

Copenhagen Accord

Cancun Outcome

Emissions reduction pledges

Developed country targets and developing country actions (invited countries to submit targets and actions)

Includes developed country targets and developing country actions as part of the decision (so-called anchoring of pledges)

Transparency

Developed country monitoring, reporting, and verification.

Developing country national communication with domestic monitoring review and verification subject to international consultation

Adds detail to the content, frequency, and review of emissions reduction and financial pledges for developed, major developing, and lesser-developed economies

Establishes details of the international consultation and analysis process for major developing countries

Financing

$30 billion of “new and additional” resources from developed countries between 2010–2012

Goal to mobilize $100 billion a year in public and private finance by 2020

High-Level Panel on finance goal

Sought to establish Green Climate Fund

Locks in the amounts listed in the Copenhagen Accord for fast-start and long-term financing

Establishes a Green Climate Fund as the operational entity for climate finance

Establishes the World Bank as the interim trustee for the fund

Establishes a Transitional Committee and Standing Committee within the COP with the goal of improving the facilitation of the fund

Technology

Sought to establish a new Technology Mechanism (expressed desire but could not execute outside the realm of the COP)

Establishes a Technology Mechanism to facilitate the technology development and transfer. Will include a Technology Executive Committee and Climate Technology Center (agreement describes the functions of both)

Reducing Emissions for Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)

Agreed on the crucial role of REDD and the need to provide positive incentives to such action and enable mobilization of resources from developed countries

Establish a process for developing countries to reduce emissions in the forest sector in such a way that could enable external financing for these efforts

Adaptation

Agreed that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financial resources, technology, and capacity building to support adaptation in developing countries

[Within financing section] Prioritized adaptation for the most vulnerable developing countries and stated that and that a balanced allocation of funding should go to mitigation and adaptation

Establishes Cancun Adaptation Framework to enhance adaptation action

Establishes an Adaptation Committee to promote implementation of enhanced action

Establishes a work program to study and address loss and damages associated with climate change

Sarah O. Ladislaw is a senior fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Audio: Post-Cancun Update - What Happened in Cancun and Where do the Climate Negotiations go from Here?

With Johnathon Pershing by CSIS

Monday, January 25, 2010

go back to Copenhagen, a little recap of what happended there

I am not trying to be nostalgia here by looking back what is now history. I went to check the Down to Earth issue on Copenhagen, reminded by a friend from Center for Science and Environment in India, where I interned last summer. I even met a co-worker then at the summit, which I'd never expected. I am fond of the sarcastic and still sharp and sober nature of their articles, even thought CSE to me is always romantic and idealistic (they probably won't put it that way).

Most people consider Copenhagen a failure. I think so too. But I also believe failure still means one step toward *success* (in relative terms always, I am a notorious Sophist in Socrates' word I just realize). I came up with a metaphor that descries the individual reflection on COP 15. I am a dandelion seed carrying with me however much enthusiasm, hope and sarcasm (does not appear to you, doesn't it? Well I keep it to myself). The seed was germinated, elevated and bloomed fully right at the beginning of the conference, when negotiations seemed to going and side events panel speakers all exciting about what they have done in the past in fighting climate change. And then it suddenly, but not without weather forecast, got smashed and blown away by the seaside wind in Copenhagen. The bits and pieces went all about. One piece of the new me residing in one of the fuzzy fragments, with my ever-lasting ever-optimistic ever-idealistic seed of hope, landed in a new place, ready to come out again in the spring. Yet it is the practical matters, after all, that keep the romantic me going. Practical matters at present refer to what I have observed and learned from folks all over the world working in the practical field of climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Okay, my metaphor stops here for now. Here is what the Down to Earth colleagues portrait what happened during the last two days of the now history COP 15.

At Copenhagen, unfortunately, industrialized countries sabotaged all possibilities of progress. They had something else in mind. When the COP-15 (Conference of Parties) started, negotiators were barely closer to a deal than they had been in Bali.

If anything there had been regression during the last one year of negotiations.

But failure was not an option. One hundred and ten heads of state were flying to Copenhagen to sign a declaration; they could not all return with their pens unused. More than that, the Nobel prize-winning US president had to emerge as a dealmaker. So in the final 48 hours, negotiators—who had laboured for years for a comprehensive deal—were brushed aside; heads of state, ministers and their top advisers took over.

Leaders started making deals in secret, in the middle of the night, in backrooms, on the fly. Carrots were offered; sticks were wielded. In the end, industrialized countries, with the last-minute complicity of India and China, penned an alarmingly weak deal—the so-called Copenhagen Accord—that appears designed to undermine the negotiations to date. Certain basic rules seem to have been changed forever. Under the captaincy of the US, historical responsibility of the developed world in creating the climate crisis has been erased. The differentiation between rich and poor countries is gone. The rich world does not want to reduce emissions, but is trying hard to stunt the development of the poor world.

The Copenhagen Accord was not officially endorsed. A few developing countries vocally opposed the document and the drafting process. But the accord—rather than any of the documents drafted through two years of multilateral negotiations—emerged as Copenhagen’s only substantive outcome. It could well become the new starting point for future negotiations. This will be disastrous for the developing world.

Thursday, December 24, 2009

Drops during COP 15

stories by pictures 看图说话

Yes things did not turn out to be as fair, ambitious and binding as we all hoped for upon the conclusion of COP 15. Yet in many lights, it was inspiring, constructive and everlasting. I want to share several little a few serendipitous moments when I was struck by what I said, what I heard, what I was part of and what I think it now.

DSCF5277

In the wake of Wednesday 16th riot, the police had pushed back the crowd. I was walking toward Bella Center trying to get in, a guy with a little video camera stopped me and asked me to say a little sth about what I think the solution [to our climate crisis] was. I replied, in gasps, that I think we need to put ourselves in each other’s shoes. We need to understand that we are one people in different forms;our lives connected. He asked me where I was from. I said China. He waved one of his hand whiling the other still holding the camera, “thanks for the Chinese wisdom.”

I don’t know if it is particularly Chinese. I just always remember a peacemaking guru who only sleeps for four hours everyday, once said that we are all one. I just cannot agree more.

DSCF5344

Thursday, 17th. The banner says “change the system, not the climate.” It was in a warehouse that turned into a working station for people who can no longer enter Bella Center. Mekel was delivering a speech within Bella Center. Heads from the governments of the world was doing that one by one. I had no interest in listening. I thought they were all to symbolic and not constructive at all. I realize how hard it was to reach an agreement when at least a few of the big potatoes did not have the sincerity and bona fide; how hard it was to really change the system.

DSC_0487

Tuesday 15th. Robert Swan giving a speech about his expeditions to both Poles. He was the first man to traverse both Arctic and Antarctic by foot. He is now taking young folks to visit an eco-base he set up in Antarctic each year. He ended the presentation with one quote from himself (pretty snobby I have to say): the greatest challenge to our climate crisis is that we think someone else will do the job.

DSCF5255

Monday 14th. I was representing our team to discuss possible venues for youth from the States, India, Japan and China to get together to deliver a joint voice. It proved to be politically difficult as well. First, the Japanese counterparts did not show up. Second, the day after that most of us would not be able to get into Bella Center. Third, the Indians want to have the Indian and Chinese youth talking to Indian and Chinese delegates, in one room, pushing our government and stand closely by the island/African countries (to kill Kyoto and have sth more radical—which was strongly disapproved by both governments).

While sitting on the floor in the absence of wine, we ignored the first obstacle and went crazy with the second one. Reed the American guy proposed that we use radio transmitters to deliver youth voice inside from outside. He said he knew a friend in Copenhagen who invented the bike system(or sth like that) who might have access to such devices. He admitted, very seriously, this idea was crazy but he can always do what he wanted to do without too much idea of how to do it. I proposed what I thought would be fun but less risky – having youth inside holding their computers in a circle, skyping in with youth outside and saying what they want with both voices and images. We all agreed and thought hard of places outside where we had wireless. Later another Indian Friend Linkesh joined and showed us a song he just wrote about Bolivia and their brave commitment as a developing country. We all sang together in a circle:

/Every day their stalling and//they’re saying the same old things again//hm-hm-hm//But one bright country stands apart,//they’re sayin’ things close to my heart.//They’ve got a plan with hope in hand,//They’re sayin’ c’mon let’s just start…//Bolivia//, I wish I was Bolivian//Just one degree temperature rise,//300 ppm in the skies,//cent per-cent emissions down by two thousand forty//Does anyone know the price of waiting//fighting, hating, procrastinating,//hm-hm-hm//My future stands in front of me,// while people here make history,//I hope and pray that it will be,//what the world’s children wish to see…//Bolivia//…//We’ve got to take the boldest steps//there’s work to do; clean up the mess.//hm-hm-hm//My future looks me in the eye,//says to me the time is nigh//It’s time to see the world agree,//time for responsibility!//Bolivia//…/

We dismissed in the urgency of going to the US-China youth joint press release. There was almost no follow-up after that, except I invited the Indian friends to come to a dinner that was just meant for the Chinese team. I will talk about that in a second.

DSCF5329

Thursday 16th. This dinner was just intended for the Chinese team and the Danish organization Energy Crossroads who gave us the chance to participate in COP 15.One team member had a very clever comment on this dinner, which in the end was joined by the Indians and Africans (sorry I had to use the general term, I did not know where in Africa they came from)—when the old generation used “Pingpong Diplomacy” to break the ice between China and the U.S. during the Cold War, we the younger ones used “Chinese food diplomacy.” I dont think it was our intention to have any diplomacy. It was just a very natural gesture for us to invite friends from afar that happened to have chance to gather on the land of fairy tales. If, just a naive thought, everyone in this world could be as native as the the young ones, we probably would have maintained better harmony.

One thing I maintained after COP 15, however disillusioned it could be, is to stay ideal, stubbornly ideal, passionately ideal, naively ideal. With vision and intention, things can be done.

Yes the adults will always tell us “it is more complicated than you can understand.” We should be aware not to grow up with unnecessary sophistication that gets simple things complicated.

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

Requiem For A Crowded Planet—Guardian.com

http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2009/12/21/requiem-for-a-crowded-planet/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email

recommended to me from a friend at Center for Science and Environment, New Delhi. It is a rather clear-headed comment on the outcome, I think. How many more rounds of talks can we wait?DSCF5318

a Mexico women in the far left, heading away from the Bella Center where the sun set, heading home for Mexico?

By George Monbiot. Published in the Guardian 21st December 2009

The last time global negotiations collapsed like this was in Doha in 2001. After the trade talks fell apart, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) assured the delegates that there was nothing to fear: they would move to Mexico, where a deal would be done. The negotiations ran into the sand of the Mexican resort of Cancun, never to re-emerge. After eight years of dithering, nothing has been agreed.

When the climate talks in Copenhagen ended in failure last week, Yvo de Boer, the man in charge of the process, urged us not to worry: everything will be sorted out “in Mexico one year from now.”(1) Is Mexico the diplomatic equivalent of the Pacific garbage patch: the place where failed negotiations go to die?

De Boer might pretend that this is just a temporary hitch, but he knows what happens when talks lose momentum. A year ago I asked him what he feared most. This is what he said. “The worst-case scenario for me is that climate becomes a second WTO. … Copenhagen, for me, is a very clear deadline that I think we need to meet, and I am afraid that if we don’t, then the process will begin to slip, and like in the trade negotiations, one deadline after the other will not be met, and we sort of become the little orchestra on the Titanic.”(2)

We can live without a new trade agreement; we can’t live without a new climate agreement. One of the failings of the people who have tried to mobilise support for a climate treaty is that we have made the issue too complicated. So here is the simplest summary I can produce of why this matters.

Human beings can live in a wider range of conditions than almost any other species. But the climate of the past few thousand years has been amazingly kind to us. It has enabled us to spread into almost all regions of the world and to grow into the favourable ecological circumstances it has created. We currently enjoy the optimum conditions for supporting seven billion people.

A shift in global temperature reduces the range of places than can sustain human life. During the last ice age, humans were confined to low latitudes. The difference in the average global temperature between now and then was four degrees centigrade. Global warming will have the opposite effect, driving people into higher latitudes, principally as water supplies diminish.

Food production at high latitudes must rise as quickly as it falls elsewhere, but this is unlikely to happen. According to the body that summarises the findings of climate science, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the potential for global food production “is very likely to decrease above about 3C”(3). The panel uses the phrase “very likely” to mean a probability of above 90%(4). Unless a strong climate deal is struck very soon, the probable outcome is a rise of three or more degrees by the end of the century.

Even in higher latitudes the habitable land area will decrease as the sea level rises. The likely rise this century - probably less than a metre - is threatening only to some populations, but the process does not stop in 2100. During the previous interglacial period, about 125,000 years ago, the average global temperature was around 1.3 degrees higher than it is today, as a result of changes in the earth’s orbit around the sun. A new paper in the scientific journal Nature shows that sea levels during that period were between 6.6 and 9.4 metres higher than today’s(5). Once the temperature had risen, the expansion of sea water and the melting of ice caps in Greenland and Antarctica was unstoppable. I wonder whether the government of Denmark, whose atrocious management of the conference contributed to its failure, would have tried harder if its people knew that in a few hundred years they won’t have a country any more.

As people are displaced from their homes by drought and sea level rise, and as food production declines, the planet will be unable to support the current population. The collapse in human numbers is unlikely to be either smooth or painless: while the average global temperature will rise gradually, the events associated with it will come in fits and starts: sudden droughts and storm surges.

This is why the least developed countries, which will be hit hardest, made the strongest demands in Copenhagen. One hundred and two poor nations called for the maximum global temperature rise to be limited not to two degrees but to 1.5. The chief negotiator for the G77 bloc complained that Africa was being asked “to sign a suicide pact, an incineration pact, in order to maintain the economic dominance of a few countries”(6).

The immediate reason for the failure of the talks can be summarised in two words: Barack Obama. The man elected to put aside childish things proved to be as susceptible to immediate self-interest as any other politician. Just as George Bush did in the approach to the Iraq war, Obama went behind the backs of the UN and most of its member states and assembled a coalition of the willing to strike a deal which outraged the rest of the world. This was then presented to poorer nations without negotiation; either they signed it or they lost the adaptation funds required to help them survive the first few decades of climate breakdown.

The British and American governments have blamed the Chinese government for the failure of the talks. It’s true that the Chinese worked hard to mess them up, but Obama also put Beijing in an impossible position. He demanded concessions while offering nothing. He must have known the importance of not losing face in Chinese politics: his unilateral diplomacy amounted to a demand for self-abasement. My guess is that this was a calculated manoeuvre guaranteed to produce instransigence, whereupon China could be blamed for the outcome he wanted.

Why would Obama do this? You have only to see the relief in Democratic circles to get your answer. Pushing a strong climate programme through the Senate, many of whose members are wholly owned subsidiaries of the energy industry, would have been the political battle of his life. Yet again, the absence of effective campaign finance reform in the US makes global progress almost impossible.

So what happens now? That depends on the other non-player at Copenhagen: you. For the past few years good, liberal, compassionate people - the kind who read the Guardian every day - have shaken their heads and tutted and wondered why someone doesn’t do something. Yet the number taking action has been pathetic. Demonstrations which should have brought millions onto the streets have struggled to mobilise a few thousand. As a result the political cost of the failure at Copenhagen is zero.

Is this music not to your taste sir, or madam? Perhaps you would like our little orchestra to play something louder, to drown out that horrible grinding noise.

www.monbiot.com

References:

1. Yvo de Boer, 19th December 2009. http://unfccc.int/2860.php

2. From transcript of video interview for the Guardian’s “Monbiot Meets” series. You can watch the edited discussion here: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/video/2008/dec/08/monbiot-yvo-de-boer-climate

3. IPCC, 2007. Assessing key vulnerabilities and the risk from climate change. Table 19.1. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter19.pdf

4. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf

5. Robert E. Kopp et al, 17th December 2009. Probabilistic assessment of sea level during the last interglacial stage. Nature Vol 462, pp863-868. doi:10.1038/nature08686

6. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/20/copenhagen-obama-brown-climate

Saturday, December 19, 2009

China-US youth joint press release

Dec. 21:
I could not find the actual word by word document of what we said, but UNFCCC has the recording here:

In fact, for anyone interested in all the press release, side events and open negotiation meetings, you can find it on UNFCCC's website. They are of good quality, presentation slides provided as well. I'd highly recommend skipping through the side events as I found them more pragmatic, promising and informative than the actual negotiations. These side events focus on the groundwork that has been done by various actors under the Kyoto Protocol in addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation.


Left: Holly Jones, we had a great conversation together as we were seated in the same small group at the US-Chinese youth dinner workshop. We were also interviewed together by a freelance journalist writing a story for Wall Street Journal about college students participating in COP 15.
Right: You Zhang, a high school student in Beijing, aged 16, the youngest in our team, but not necessarily the smallest~
Left: our team manager, Holly Chang, a San Francisco born Chinese American, CEO of Goldbridges, a nonprofit organizations dedicated in bridging outside philanthropist/nonprofit organizations with local Chinese grassroots nonprofits.
Right: Ben Wessel, a leader of the SustainUS American youth delegation.
Two our of team photographers shooting each other. Me in blue. A journalist from China Daily asking question. I forgot the content, you can find it toward the end of the press release.

We were supposed to release a joint statement declaring our shared stance to our leaders in pushing for a FAB agreement at Copenhagen. Yet we never delivered, just like our expectation to COP. We could have released way earlier, but there was some disagreement with the US counterparts at the time. And the towards the end of negotiation, we found ourselves in dilemma as whether we should do it at all--when Hillary announced 100 bn USD promise, on condition that China agree to MRV (ie. providing measurable, reportable and verifiable emission reduction data and open to international examination). Hillary totally turned the table against China at the last moment, leaving the choice for China to either loose its face and save the deal or save its face loose the deal (this is a rather obvious question for many of us but for many present leaders in China, face is more important than anything else). We were afraid any statement we have could be used against the Chinese government (eg. even the Chinese youth is pressuring its own government, which put the whole team in some kind of jeopardy, or were bribed by the US government, etc.). We were aware that we did not have this sort of brand opportunity to publicize and manifest our hope for a shared understanding and future, minimizing the cultural and political barriers. We made decision to step out of the muddy water and seek some other chance to deliver the statement.
I have the draft statement but I am sure if I should post it here. Anyone interested could ask me for it and any inputs will be appreciated.
I'd highly recommend this blog if you are interested in more COP 15 and green economy issues in general related to China http://greenleapforward.com/

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insiders' notes of the meeting on Saturday morning

i posted a few countries' speeches here, the original update was rather long. It is interesting to see the reactions inside the conference hall, in an all-night meeting. Despite the unfruitful result, I do respect these delegates' efforts, given they are human beings as well.

Su Wei, one high level Chinese delegate, still took time to sign a petition to let some Chinese NGO reps into Bella Center, after not sleeping for a couple days. Maybe the inefficiency came from the tiredness, but there does not seem to be other way. The whole world was watching, putting pressuri on, especially when Hillary totally turned the table against China, forcing it to agree to UN verification of its reduction results (so called MRV).

Rasmussen opened and then suspended the COP very quickly. He then raced through the CMP and put forward the infamous "President's Text". [ Note for those of you who haven't followed, check out http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/18/a-meaningful-and-unprecedented-breakthrough-here-copenhagen - where Obama shares his "text" created with consultations with a few key countries (China, India, Brazil) He gave countries an hour to review the text and suspended the meeting even as Richard Kinley (Secretariat) leaned over and told him of an impending point of order. Rasmussen replied: "There is no point" (WTF)

As Rasmussen et al. were leaving Venezuela started banging its plate on the table and the whole room started clapping. Rasmussen sat back and watched the chaos unfold! He apologize and said that he hadn't noticed there was a point of order.

The rest of the countries that follow are responding to the process that Rasmussen proposed - in addition to the content of the document that Rasmussen (and the US) proposed.

Tuvalu:
Calls on Ban Ki Moon's presence to recognize that UN Processes are democratic, but what we've seen happen in COP15 has been completely undemocratic, conducted in closed door sessions.
Beyond that, Tuvalu had major problems with the content of the text:
- The text fails to recognize Kyoto Protocol
- International Insurance Mechanism isn't mentioned
- Review by 2015 (too late for our future)
- Science based targets mean 1.5 degrees for Tuvalu's survival, rather than the 2 degrees that is outlined in this document
- Using a biblical image, we're being offered 30 pieces of silver to betray our people
- OUR FUTURE IS NOT FOR SALE
- Tuvalu cannot accept this document

Bolivia:(note: Bolivia is rather applauded for its ambitious reduction commitment as a developing country)
- We are most offended by the process: we haven't had time to read this document; we've just now seen that it is a two page document and without putting this before us - those of us who represent OTHER people.
- Can one hour actually allow us the time to consider the implications for the people we represent?
- Does this represent the democracy of the United Nations?
- Can one hour allow us the time to make such a decision? To consult our constituents?

Maldives:
I commend the work that the Danish Prime Minister is doing and has done to bring a fruitful conclusion to COP15
We have a real danger of UNFCCC talks going the same way as WTO talks or other such multilateral talks. In many issues, this can be tolerated, or can be allowed. Scienc shows that in climate change, this is just not possible. We have a window of seven years. If real, actual measures are not take, gross climate can reach tipping points.

Engaged with more than 25 countries; big emitting countries are refusing to raise their ambitions high, neither are they allowing us to raise our ambitions to a level where world temperatures will not rise over 1.5 degrees. Above 1.5 degrees, many such islands would vanish. This is why we ahve tried so hard for 1.5 degrees to be in the text, and we can migrate from this document to many of our aspirations.

If we cannot have a basic understand of the parameters, we will never have any fruitful decision of these talks. I call on all governments to back this document and not to allow these talks to collapse.

Spain:
- Govt from Sudan

Canada:
- Offensive for government Sudan to associate climate change with the Holocaust and these remarks should be withdrawn

Australia:
- Cynical way that this document has been reviewed by all governments in the room
- Governments made commitments to finance
- That they could be so belittled is adisgrace to this organization and conference - we are not going to ignore the pleas of the Maldives, but we are going to keep on trying

France:
- My country will sign this declaration, we defended the inclusion of 1.5 degrees Celsius because the islands of Maldives should be heard here and only one big emitter country was opposed to that. We found it useful, Mr President, to ahve this type of text, because normal procedures of the UNFCCC leave us in a deadlock, we thought we were facing failure. Heads of States do represent 4 billion people started working, trying to help us, and of course, this text must be imperfect and we can improve these drafts and these texts but we are deeply wounded by accusations and suspicions as we did just try to break the deadlock. We believe that we will be able to use this document to help millions.

Sweden:
On behalf of EU, I want to express strong support for President of the Maldives statement. The reference to the Holocaust in this context is absolutely despicable.

UK:
There is a document that has been created in good faith under a process supervised by you; it is by no means perfect and it certainly has problems for many people. However, in substantive ways, it will make the lives of those around the world better (30 billion short term and 100 billion long-term finance). We can accept this document and get the money flowing OR we can follow the
- Taking this document as a "for information" document will not help

The President of the COP "I am not familiar with the processes here. Can I see how many people would oppose this process?"

United States: there is nothing to apologize for in participating in the Friends of the Chair. This included Heads of State meant to build on what had been going on over past two years and bridge important gaps in what had been done in the past. There was broad participation between about 25 - 30 countries. The President of the US was one of those who attended, and as a part of that meeting that went on for many hours, the President met with leaders of india, China, S Africa and Brazil in a highly engaged process, designed to bring people together.
The results were not perfect, but they are important. A limit of 2 degrees in temperature. It did
Accountability, transparency in all parts
Very substantial financin

Friday, December 18, 2009

From a fellow youth delegate:
I was outside in the Reclaim Power in the march, and one of my colleagues and I from the Canadian Youth Delegation was able to capture a lot of thefootage of the police brutality.

This happened right before I came to Bella Center around noon. Who are the police angry with?

towards the end of Copenhagen

1:50 pm, Dec 18. Last day of the Copenhagen Talk. I don't know when the negotiations will continue on today. It is definitely not looking good. I am posting internal communication emails here for the first time to just show how things "progress" and state of emotions of the few youth delegates inside Bella Center

The youth constituency under UNFCCC was angry and frustrated.

3:30 am December 18
>interesting developments tonight. as the drafting groups were meeting
>and agreeing text, the president was drafting another text that could
>serve to undermine the work. the powers that be are still trying to
>force a single outcome and have floated a text that joins KP and LCA
>despite numerous statements by the G77 and China that they want a two-
>track outcome, and a two-track process. the G77 still is insisting on
>an open process, with documents drafted out in the open rather than
>behind closed doors. there were G77 consultations with the result
>that the G77 again requested a two-track outcome with a friends of the
>chair process where representation in the group was transparent and
>acceptable.
>
>it's getting interesting, but not necessarily pleasant. the G77
>continues to be angry at the untransparency of a process where the
>president says one thing is happening and the next thing you know
>there is a new text drafted by some unknown group put on the table.
>

11:30 am

The Danish government produced a document, lets say a political declaration
to be signed by all the heads of states and government
of less than 3 pages. It seems that all the discussions we attended this night
were just a show, just a manner to occupy the delegates with something.
It seems that this will be the only outcome,
I didn\t read the texte yet, it\s being negotiated now
but they did exactly what they were accused of being trying to do
no new period under kyoto, no commitments
may be everything is being postponed!
A very non-transparent process!
manipulated everyone,,,
didn't hear our voices,,,


Youth Statement to the High-Level Segment of COP15*
To be presented by one of these four plenary-admitted youth, between 12:00 and 14:00 today:

Good afternoon my fellow human beings.
>
>My name is X, and in the year 2050 I will be X years old.
>
>I am proud to represent the International youth climate movement.
>
>Christina Ora, a 17 year old from the Solomon Islands, addressed the opening
>plenary last Monday. She said *"I was born in 1992. You have been
>negotiating all my life. You cannot tell us that you need more time."*
>
>We have worked the past two years promising to reach a conclusion in
>Copenhagen. Now it seems you will not get it done.
>
>*This is unacceptable, you should be ashamed.*
>
>The United Nations was created to solve humanitarian and social crises, but
>instead of standing united, you are now the Divided Nations.
>
>Humanity can and must do better.
>
>Mother Nature will not negotiate with us.
>
>You must set targets to get us back below 350parts per million.
>
>You must agree on fair and sufficient financing - 5-7% of GDP - to pay back
>the ecological debt to the most affected.
>
>We the youth dream of a sustainable future shared by all humanity.
>
>There is wisdom in the people's hearts, and people are ingenious. We CAN
>solve this crisis - IF ONLY we choose to.
>
>We do not accept the 3-degree deal that the current proposals on the table
>are bringing us to, and we support those nations who won't sign this suicide
>pact.
>
>We call on all nations not to accept anything that does not guarantee
>survival and climate justice for all.
>
>There must be no decisions about us, without us. We refuse to have our
>futures sold and 'offset' by polluter lobbyists.
>
>The Youth believe that you care enough for the future of your children and
>grandchildren to sign a legally-binding, fair and ambitious, inspiring
>agreement which reflects 'the fierce urgency of now'.
>
>Rest assured that we the youth will keep on working, and we will keep on
>pushing you harder and harder, until that necessary deal is sealed.
>
>Thank you.

Thursday, December 17, 2009

Al Gore's speech on Wednesday

he especially applauded the meeting between the Chinese and U.S. young delegates as an example of collaboration/agreement between the youth of the world and our commitment to a shared secured future--if, the leaders of the present, can act now.

Youth Sit-in for Real Climate Treaty Ends With Global Call to Action

As youth, we'd love the wide circulation of this article to raise our voice from inside out! Thanks!

COPENHAGEN, Denmark – As the high-level segment of the Copenhagen climate talks began last night, a group of thirty young people from fourteen countries staged a sit-in in the heart of the conference center.

“The world needs a fair, ambitious, and legally-binding deal that will avoid dangerous climate change,” said Laura Comer, age 21, of Strongsville, Ohio, USA. “We decided it would be irresponsible for us to leave the conference center until we had a deal that would ensure the safety and survival of all people worldwide.”

Sitting in the hall for more than nine hours, the youth read the names of over 11 million global citizens who signed a petition calling for a fair, ambitious, and legally-binding deal. The action received unprecedented support from inside and outside the UN climate summit, with a positive endorsement from political officials, and thousands of supporters following the action via a live webcast and social media. At about 2:00 AM, after receiving an ultimatum from UN officials, the youth chose to end their sit-in.

“The world has spoken and we felt compelled to deliver that message in Copenhagen on their behalf. But we were told that if we didn’t leave the center, civil society would be excluded from the negotiations for the remainder of the talks,” said Sanka Chandima Abayawardena, age 25, from Divulapitiya, Sri Lanka. “Without any participation from grassroots civil society in the negotiations, we felt it would be impossible to secure the sort of deal that my country and the world so desperately needs.”

The youth from yesterday’s sit-in are now mobilizing a global call for all people around the world, particularly young people, to organize similar actions of non-violent civil disobedience targeting obstructive governments, destructive industries, and fossil fuel financiers.

“The global support for our sit-in is undeniable evidence that the world is calling for change. We must actively pressure our governments for a just, ambitious, and binding deal that listens to science and is led by the voices of those most directly impacted by the climate crisis,” adds Janice Grey, age 20, from Nunavik, Canada, “We can no longer allow our governments to wait, stall, or block progress. Now is the time to take our future back!”

Wednesday, December 16, 2009

Copenhagen Day 10: red flag up!

Just follow my pictures of my day today. It was supposed to be the last day NGOs can get into Bella Center. I was to enter around 1 o'clock to atten an side event on women as agent of change. I knew something would be going on outside Bella around noonish, somthing big and heavy. I went anyway, despite that my colleague who I was taking the secondary pass from, called me not to as she was almost pushed into the river outside the entrance in the demonstration crowd. Why not come? Despite the heavy snow, if the world is burning, I am burning with it.


At metro station, the sign said "demonstration is ongoing." The train did not stop at Bella Center anymore. I had to walk one more stop.

A Beijing based film producers was shooting a documentary about China's role in climate change. He was following two folks from the National Reform and Development Committee. He just included me all along in his filming asking me to talk about my state of mind--why I am here in Copenhagen, why I am going to the Bella Center knowing the fact there is a demonstration, etc.It was my first time jumble along in front a video camera. I spoke very fast, in bad English. I was cold and hungry.

NGOs outside Bella Center shot at the Middle East folks to go back home and quite oil. I don't know if they are the solution. But people were angry.

There was drumming behind the the politi cars, the whole road was blocked.
They've been here for a while. I just never had a chance to shoot them. Perhaps not the courage.
Standing quietly, cold and hungry, I waited outside the entrance for almost an hour. The police had not let single one NGO in. I was about to leave and the English film maker called me to wait for him for a few more filming and questions. Meanwhile, I took pictures of a group of vegan/vegetarian advocates. They have been here everyday since the start of the conference, morning to evening. They handle out flax bags that says go veggie and videos of all sorts of celebrities talking about they they went veg-- and scientists on why.
Despite the TV screen, they are a quiet group, composing mostly of Asian women, sometimes dressed in animal customs. I decided to include them in my blog today, as in violence and chaos, they offered us peace and elevation.

This also spoke to me as my frustration of not being able to have much vegetarian meal choice during my days here. Within Bella Center, the only veggie choice is salad (sometimes they provide cheese which I dont like) and ocasionally you have cold egg or humus sandwich. In Burger King, only one veggie burger with only veggie in it, no protein. In a Chinese restaurant takeout, they only have veggie fried spring roll as your veggie option. No protein. And I have not seen tofu anywhere. Yes cheese, but usually with meat. I am not a pure vegetarian; I eat fish. I'd left with cheese and very expensive nuts here as my alternative. I was told you got understand this is northern Europe. I don't. I am for one time, proud of where I am in the U.S., when we are provided with many vegetarian options (regardless the heavy marketing of soil products led by the soil plantation industry).
Meanwhile meat consumption is soaring in China, reaching 53 gram per day in 2005. Yet it is small compared to 70-130 g/day in developed countries. But China is by far the largest meat producer in the world (China Daily). Folks at home are all rather concerned about me not eating meat rather than limited fish. I find it hard to prove to them my energetic and clear-head (or maybe despite my forgetfulness of personal belongings) spirit and healthy happy being.




Tuesday, December 15, 2009

Copenhagen Summit Saturday Mass Rally--No Other Way NOW


A glimpse of our Chinese No Other Way-NOW "block". Shot from my camera on the road. I recorded in my video camera as well but have not had a chance to upload it and edit it.

For many of us, it was the first time to go on a demonstration of this magnitude. We were perhaps more cheerful than demanding.
Yue made a slogan that goes like:
"make love not CO2, give less birth plant more trees" (this was applauded in Chinese, a rather popular slogan you will hear in rural China...:)

Copenhagen Summit Saturday Mass Rally


Saturday Mass Rally--"10 thousand people maybe more" "Now is the time" "Survival is not Negotiable"
shot from City Hall Plaza



Tuesday, November 17, 2009

Climate: A defining issue

Richard Black and his blog--a great resource for what's going on with COP 15, what will be going on: http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/richardblack/

Tuesday, 17 November 2009

A couple of weeks ago, the cat came well and truly out of the bag: there would not be a legally binding treaty at the UN climate summit in Copenhagen next month.

Or will there?

During his meeting on Tuesday with China's President Hu Jintao, President Obama appeared to indicate that some sort of comprehensive agreement was still possible.

Then, Danish Prime Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen, speaking to a pre-summit meeting of environment ministers, called for developed nations to bring firm targets to Copenhagen - targets that should be binding.

Presidents Hu and ObamaAll of this is very much at odds with statements from a number of European officials and ministers during and directly after the recent UN negotiating session in Barcelona, which were variations on the theme that a legally-binding deal was "unlikely", "extremely unlikely" or "impossible".

It certainly poses more questions. What does "legally binding" mean in this context? What does the alternative being bandied around - "politically binding" - mean?

And where does the formulation that President Obama used in his Beijing speech - "not a partial accord or a political declaration, but rather an accord that covers all of the issues in the negotiations and one that has immediate operational effect" - fit in to the overall picture?

We are into a miasma of nuance here; but for different parties, all of the nuances are important, so it's worth having a look at what's being suggested, what might actually transpire, and who's likely to be happy or unhappy.

So let's go back to the Bali meeting nearly two years ago and the pledge, in the Bali Action Plan (BAP), to produce something new by Copenhagen.

The BAP doesn't actually prescribe a legally-binding treaty, although that's an interpretation and an outcome that's been accepted by most governments as desirable and necessary.

You could argue that something legally-binding is implied by the agreement that all developed countries must adopt "measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives".

What is explicit is that a Copenhagen agreement must "achieve the ultimate objective of the [UN climate] convention" - in other words, must stabilise "greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system".

In the broadest sense, then, there is acknowledgement by all governments that everything enacted before - the UN climate convention of 1992, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 - could not achieve that goal, and something new was needed.

That "something else", according to BAP, would have to be bigger and bolder, encompassing emissions cuts by rich countries, curbs on the rate of growth of emissions by major developing countries, and finance and technology transfer to help poorer countries constrain their emissions and adapt to climate impacts. ( Three goals)

It was described by UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband as the most complex set of international negotiations ever, on any issue.

Power station

Two principal factors now line up to prevent a full binding treaty emerging in Copenhagen. One is the sheer amount of negotiating needed in a tight period of time; the other is that the US has yet to put any commitments on the table and may not do so before the summit.

What a number of developing countries are still demanding - joined, apparently, by Mr Rasmussen - is something that is firmly binding even though it might not carry any formally legal weight, let alone the paraphernalia of a full treaty.

But how can that be?

Recall first that these treaties don't become binding on anyone until they've been ratified by enough countries to gain the status of international law. In the case of Kyoto, that took eight years - and in the case of Copenhagen, we don't yet have an agreement on the legal form of any treaty, let alone what would trigger its adoption as law.

Secondly, one of the bases for the Copenhagen process has been that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed".

(A better phrase might be "nothing is binding until everything is binding, because certain things such as an agreement on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) could conceivably emerge as a self-standing entity whatever the carnage around it.")

Are governments really going to grant binding status to something that includes main numbers on emissions targets and finance, but omits details that for some nations might turn out to be crucial? This has to be a consensus of 192 countries, not a majority vote.

Thirdly, what is there except international law that can bind countries to anything?

When it comes to the form and status of something that is not international law but is more than just a promise, I for one am out of ideas; if anyone has a clearer notion, I'd be very happy if you can spell it out for us in a comment.

A fourth issue is that some countries are very unhappy about signing up to anything that is not legally binding. A number of developing nations including Sudan (chair of the G77/China bloc), Grenada and Barbados have been making noises about not agreeing to anything that is not legally binding.

Their position is that we had the politically-binding agreement in Bali. In a sense, we had it in Rio; this is supposed to be the time for delivery on those fine words.

And it not just small developing countries; a number of European delegates have said that no deal is better than a bad deal, and presumably if they do not see the requisite amount of "binding" in the text, they will not sign, whatever embarrassment that might cause the Danish hosts.

The runes on this story appear to shift their shape daily. Experienced negotiators and observers suggest the fog is unlikely to clear before the final Copenhagen dawn on December 18th.

To the outside observer, it might seem a strange old way to try and solve a problem that most governments acknowledge as a serious and urgent threat to humanity's prospects.

But if there's one thing that governments appear to consider truly binding in this process, it's the requirement to obfuscate and procrastinate right down to the wire.

Monday, November 9, 2009

Headline : Race to kill kyoto protocol

Down to Earth, Center for Science and Environment, New Delhi, India

Intro:As Copenhagen nears, Obama’s America sees new hope: Yes, we can...dump climate multilateralism. In Bangkok, most developed countries joined the charge. Their methods: jettison equity, peddle domestic actions and dangle carrots to break developing country unity. Some, like India, show signs of wavering. Kushal Pal Singh Yadav tracks negotiations in Bangkok

An atmosphere of gloom prevailed in the galleries of the United Nations Conference Centre in Bangkok on October 9, 2008. It was the last day of talks on climate change, and there was near-unanimity that the Kyoto Protocol was going to die. Delegates from developing countries were an angry lot. Those from developed countries did not seem to care much.


The penultimate meeting, just a few negotiating days before the big one at Danish capital Copenhagen in December, had been chosen to sound the death knell for the internationally binding agreement on emission reductions (see box: Genesis of Kyoto). Chinese chief negotiator Yu Qingtai put it succinctly: “Developed country partners are trying to invent something totally new two months before Copenhagen and asking everybody else to come along. That’s not the way to conduct negotiations.”

The first nail in the coffin was driven in by the US, the biggest polluter that first refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and is now dragging its feet on committing to a healthy cut in emissions. US inaction, cried delegations of developing countries, is inciting other developed countries to dump the protocol. “The developed countries need to rise to the challenge rather than race to the bottom with the US,” said Lumumba Stanislaus-Kaw Di Aping, head of Sudanese delegation and chair of G77 plus China. But isn’t the Barack Obama administration more progressive about climate change? “Obama has only offered some of the most progressive utterances,” Lumumba shot back.

In the last week of talks in Bangkok developed countries (referred to as Annex I under the protocol) developed cold feet; they were not ready to commit to emission reduction targets for the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol. The first phase ends in 2012. The discussion came to a standstill.

In addition to the US, the European Union (EU), which had for long been claiming the moral high ground, turned out to be the villain. EU had proposed a reduction target of 20 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020. This could go up to 30 per cent if an ambitious deal were signed in Copenhagen. EU had been banking on the US passing its climate change bill before the Copenhagen meet (see: Kerry-Boxer doesn’t pack a punch on P 28). That would have meant some sort of legal commitment from the US to reduce its emissions. But during the Bangkok meet it became clear that the US climate legislation would not be ready in time for Copenhagen.

So EU was faced with a situation where it would have committed to a reduction target without any commitment from the US.

Seeing that the biggest polluter might not come to Copenhagen with any reduction target, most developed countries began abandoning the Kyoto process. Japan, the other major party under Kyoto, has also expressed reservations about continuing under a Kyoto regime.

Why we need Kyoto
The negotiations on climate change take place under two ad hoc working groups.

The deadlock in the group discussing the reduction targets for Annex I countries had repercussions on the group debating long-term emission cuts by all nations and implementation of the Bali Action Plan, a roadmap to conclude a deal at Copenhagen. After failed negotiations in the first group, developing countries did not see any merit in continuing with negotiations in the second group. The ground was prepared for EU to make a pitch for a new unified treaty.

“There is now a concerted effort to somehow put the Kyoto Protocol aside and to say we need a new instrument in which the commitments of both those that are party to the protocol and those that are not party to the protocol could be reflected,” said Shyam Saran, Indian prime minister’s special envoy on climate change.

But the new treaty is also meant to reflect the commitments of developing countries, or at least the major developing countries. It is a call to throw out of the window the differentiation of responsibility for climate change. Emissions by the developed countries over the past decades are today haunting the developing countries. Developed nations are responsible, developing countries are not. This differentiation is at the heart of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) and climate negotiations. Under Kyoto, developing countries are allowed to increase emissions so that they can develop.

EU reaffirmed its faith in the Kyoto process at press conferences, but said it was looking at one legal treaty that would include the Kyoto system, albeit in bits and pieces.

Developing countries are sceptical. “We do not accept the argument that you can save a legal instrument by tearing it to pieces and keeping the parts that you believe are good,” Chinese negotiator Yu retorted. “It’s a basic contradiction; you kill a document so that you can save it.”

“We are being told that a new and single instrument is essential if we want an agreement at Copenhagen. It does not need a great deal of imagination to see what this could lead to,” Saran said in the closing plenary in Bangkok. The proposals, far from enhancing climate change actions, will end up diluting the commitments of Annex I countries, unilaterally imposing new commitments and burdens on developing countries, he added.

Developing countries, more specifically what are termed emerging economies, the likes of India and China, are under pressure from developed countries to commit to emission-reduction targets. The US and EU have been bullying them to abandon the equity principle—that every individual has an equal share of atmospheric space—and to focus on actual emissions.

“We want to achieve the substantive goals of Kyoto, but we can do this only if we widen the participation. We are convinced that we need to bring into a single legal instrument all that we have done in Kyoto but make it applicable to a much wider participation—the US on the one hand and the emerging developing countries who have become large emitters on the other hand,” Jonathan Pershing, the chief US negotiator, said in Bangkok.

Adopting the same tenor, EU advocated dumping the per capita emissions approach based on the equity principle. Speaking on behalf of the developing nations, Yu tore into their web of arguments. “Emission aggregates don’t stand alone in abstract. Behind a country’s emissions are human beings. Each of them is entitled to a fair share of the common atmospheric space in the world,” he said. “I am sure everyone believes all are born equal. As a Chinese, I don’t think anyone can persuade me to believe that being born a Chinese would give me less entitlement compared to what someone born in a developed country would get. That is politically and morally incorrect.”

In the midst of relentless pressure and lobbying it seems one person blinked.


Just to bring the US into the fold does not mean that an instrument with more than a 100 parties is set aside. We are being told that a new, single instrument is essential for an agreement at Copenhagen. We are not engaged in negotiating a new climate change treaty.
-SHYAM SARAN,
Indian delegation headM

What they are trying to do during the past week or so is a concerted effort to put an end to Kyoto protocol and everything that protocol represents. It's a basic contradiction; you kill a document so that you can save it. It's just incomprehensible.
-YU QINGTAI,
Chinese delegation head

Attempts to replace the protocol will be counterproductive. Developed nations need to rise to the challenge, not race to the bottom with the US.
-LUMUMBA DI APING,
Sudanese Ambassador, G-77 + China Chair
When you have big countries not acting, then countries of a similar status feel 'we don't have to do anything too'. So rather than being aspirational everyone wants to do nothing. And the end outcome: we are more threatened, more vulnerable and our future more insecure.
-ALBERT BINGER,
Scientific advisor to Grenada, Chair of AOSIS

Sadly for India, it was its environment minister Jairam Ramesh.

India fumbles
Ramesh, in a confidential note to the prime minister, suggested a drastic shift in India’s stance in climate negotiations. Key suggestions included making compromises to bring the US on board an international agreement, putting in place domestic legislation for emission reduction, aligning more with the G20 than G77 and China, delinking mitigation actions from financing and technology transfer from Annex I countries, and a trade-off on climate negotiations in favour of securing a UN Security Council seat.

This was not the first time Ramesh expressed views widely divergent from India’s position. During his earlier visit to the US, he was quoted as saying that India would be open to verification of all its actions on mitigating climate change. India’s official position is that only the actions enabled by multilateral financing will be open for international verification. In fact, India has always opposed any kind of scrutiny of its domestic actions. In Bangkok this very issue led to an argument between an Indian negotiator and Pershing.

Following a backlash from all quarters on his note, Ramesh was forced to issue a clarification that India will never agree to eliminate the distinction between developed and developing countries. “I have never at any stage considered or advocated abandoning the fundamental tenets of the Kyoto Protocol,” the minister clarified.

But by suggesting that India might pass a greenhouse gas mitigation law, Ramesh seems to have walked into the US trap. The US has for long been advocating that instead of a multilateral, internationally binding treaty, each country pass its own mitigation law. In Bangkok, Pershing clearly stated that the US favoured “every country commits at home” and takes national actions which can then be enshrined in an international treaty.

Such an approach will destroy Kyoto. Climate change is not a domestic problem because CO2 emissions do not know national boundaries. A global problem requires a global response. The US has been advocating that every country does what it can, and not what science demands of it. This approach will kill the multilateral process.

This will also mean delinking mitigation actions from financing and technology transfer, and that will be not be affordable for developing countries. India is, in any case, doing whatever it can to address climate change. In fact, it is doing far more than it is required to, more than the US and many other developed countries. But high-end technology options come at a cost. Under the Bali Action Plan, it was agreed by all parties that the developed countries would pay full, incremental costs for adaptation and mitigation actions in developing countries. They have to pay for their historical responsibility.

Linking a geopolitical issue like a Security Council seat to a soft stand at climate negotiations is not a good idea. By moving away from developing countries’ group (G77 and China), India will get isolated. There is no way it can then get a Security Council seat. G77 plus China has been a major force in negotiations, thwarting developed countries’ attempts at diluting Kyoto processes.

Ramesh’s eagerness to bring the US into the mainstream has led him to suggest measures that would compromise the very basis of negotiations, the unfccc and the Kyoto Protocol. Ramesh maintains that India supports any means to bring the US into the mainstream, without diluting the basic Annex I and non-Annex I distinction. But he is again faltering. This time by supporting the Australian proposal put forward earlier this year. The proposal creates a kind of schedule where all countries have commitments of similar nature, though the level of effort may differ. It is similar to the US approach of blurring the distinction between developed and developing countries. In Bangkok, the US asked for a single deal that puts similar commitments on all countries.

The Australian proposal suggests replacing the Kyoto Protocol with a series of national "schedules", in which countries record climate action plans and agree to be legally bound by what they themselves suggest.

For the industrialized world, the proposal has an intoxicating allure. It abandons the principal tenet of the Kyoto architecture that there is a fundamental difference between developed and developing countries. Instead it applies the framework of "Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions and Commitments" to everyone. It also opens other core elements of Kyoto, like targets, to renegotiation.

For instance, a discussion draft Australia submitted to the unfccc in May offered the following clarification: "The objective of this Agreement is to achieve an environmentally sound response to climate change...through unified long-term action that sets the world on a path to peak global emissions by [X] and then reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by [X] per cent by [X] on [X] levels..."



Australia proposes that all countries decide their own targets. This creates ample scope for horse-trading

Speaking before the New York University School of Law in September, Australia’s climate minister Penny Wong said, “In putting Australia’s proposal forward we are seeking once again to help find common ground where it has thus far eluded us.” Later in the speech she neatly packed the premise of the Australian proposal in feel-good jargon: “The design (of an agreement) itself can influence the level of ambition of the agreement because the design will influence the level of confidence the parties have.”

Subversion proposal
Translated into simple English it means: countries will sign an agreement in earnest only if it is flexible enough not to impose commitments they don’t like. This matters because an agreement will be durable only if countries sign earnestly. In turn, confidence in the enduring cachet of an agreement alone will bring countries to the negotiating table willing to make concessions. So the Australian logic is: if we want countries to agree to do more, we have to let them do less.

In the run-up to Copenhagen, delegates should understand the perversity and politics of this logic. They must closely scrutinize three issues. First, that the Australian proposal jettisons the principle of historical responsibility. The May discussion draft does not even contain the word “historical”. It also sterilizes the principle of common but differentiated responsibility by extending it to an absurd limit: every country is unique, so we must reject legally binding distinctions like Annex I and Non-Annex I countries. Although the proposal does not say countries like India, China or Brazil should take on targets, it also forbears to say they should not.

Second, the proposal suggests building an international agreement by collating national proposals. The May draft states, “Countries would put forward draft national schedules as part of the negotiation process. This would provide an opportunity for transparent assessment of the comparability of effort and comment on the draft schedules.”

The idea that science should determine the global level of effort, and principles of equity and responsibility should determine their distribution, is missing. Instead, following—or perhaps leading—the US example, domestic laws are allowed to set the global agenda.

Third, the very notion that without any guiding principles of equity or fairness, a free-for-all negotiation among 200 countries will yield fair results, beggars belief. Ramesh’s suggestion to the prime minister that India could obtain a Security Council seat by softening its climate position hints at the kind of horse-trading that could ensue.

Ever sanguine, Wong offered a salve in her speech: “For developing countries, taking on international mitigation obligations for the first time is a big deal, but the flexibilities in schedules are designed to give them greater comfort.” If “developing” is replaced by “developed”, the statement becomes insightful, much like the Australian minister’s closing remark: “Naturally, even the perfect design can only take us so far. The level of ambition (of the next agreement) will ultimately be determined by the political will of the parties.”

Prospects of getting an equitable and ambitious deal at Copenhagen are dimming by the day. It is now almost certain that the US will not be able to pass its climate bill in time for Copenhagen. American chief negotiator Todd Stern has said he would not go beyond what the US Congress is willing to endorse. As it did with Kyoto, the US is all set to let the world down a second time.

With inputs from Jaisel Vadgama



---------- BOX:Genesis of Kyoto ----------


The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992. The UNFCCC provides a framework to stabilize greenhouse gases at a level that would prevent “dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the climate system”.

The framework convention recognized developed countries as the source of past and current greenhouse gas emissions, and made them responsible to cut their greenhouse gas emissions. Developing nations were given the time and space to increase their emissions in the pursuit of development. Thus, a principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was established.

In 1997, parties to the convention agreed to a Protocol to the UNFCCC in Kyoto, Japan. The Kyoto Protocol commits industrialized nations (known as Annex I under the treaty) to emission reduction targets.

These countries agreed to reduce their overall emissions by 5.2% below 1990 levels in the first commitment period of 2008-2012. Specific targets varied from country to country, ranging from -8% for the EU collectively to +10% for Iceland. The Kyoto Protocol came into force in February 2005.

Negotiations are on for the reduction targets of Annex I countries in the second commitment period. The Bali Action Plan, adopted in Bali in December 2007, set a deadline for the conclusion of negotiations at Copenhagen in December 2009.




---------- BOX:Kyoto diary ----------


December 11, 1997: Kyoto Protocol adopted with legally binding emission reduction targets for developed countries.

November 1998: The Byrd-Hagel resolution unanimously passed by the US Senate rejecting Kyoto

2001: The Third IPCC report presented the worst case scenario with the average global temperatures rising by 6 degrees Celsius within a century

July 2001: Most countries decide to continue with the ratification process at the climate Summit in Bonn

December 2002: Countries in the process of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol promise to do so within a year